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Abstract 
Earnings management has received considerable attention in recent times. This is due to its linkage with the 
reliability of published accounting reports. Indication from the academic literature has shown that the 
practice of earnings management is quite extensive among publicly traded firms. In response to the demand 
for greater proportion of independent directors on corporate boards and the need for financial sophistication 
of audit committee members, this study examines the role of the board of directors and audit committee in 
preventing earnings management in Nigeria. Using a questionnaire survey, the study finds that board 
dominated by outside directors brings a greater breadth of experience to the firm and are in a better position 
to monitor and control managers, thereby reducing earnings management. It was also observed that audit 
committee whose members possess certain level of financial competencies would reduce the likelihood of 
earnings management. The study recommends that board composition should include greater proportion of 
independent outside directors with corporate experience. Audit committee members should be encouraged 
to possess a certain level of financial competencies in order to decrease the likelihood of earnings 
management.  
Keyword: Earnings management, audit committee, board composition, corporate governance, Nigeria 
 
1.  Introduction 
The issue of earnings management and corporate governance mechanisms has received considerable 
attention in recent years from academics, market participants, and regulators.  It continues to receive 
attention due to recent corporate failures that has bought about doubts in the minds of stakeholders on the 
credibility and reliability of financial report. Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in 
financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some 
stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual 
outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers (Healy & Whalen 1998). 
There has been a considerable debate in recent times concerning the need for strong corporate governance 
(Adeyemi & Fagbemi 2010; Adeyemi & Uadiale 2010; Dabor & Adeyemi 2009; McConomy & Bujaki 
2000) with countries around the world drawing up guidelines and codes of practice to strengthen 
governance (Cadbury 1992; Corporate Governance Code of Nigeria 2005).  
Little wonder therefore that several studies and initiatives have been undertaken by countries and 
International Institutions on the subject “corporate governance”. As a result of the foregoing, several codes 
of corporate practices and conduct have been fashioned out and are in use in various jurisdictions including 
Nigeria. The rationale for this emphasis can be linked to increased concerns over the integrity of securities 
markets (International Federation of Accountants-IFAC 2003; Millstein 1999).  
Good corporate governance by boards of directors and audit committee is recognized to influence the 
quality of financial reporting which in turn impacts investors’ confidence. Studies have shown that good 
governance reduces the adverse effects of earnings management as well as the likelihood of creative 
financial reporting arising from fraud or errors (Beasley 1996; Dechow et al. 1996; McMullen 1996). As a 
result, there has been a concerted effort to devise ways of enhancing independence and effectiveness of the 
board of directors and audit committee (Blue Ribbon Committee 1999; Corporate Governance Code of 
Nigeria 2005).  
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Earnings management can only be curbed when the board of directors and audit committee amongst others 
perform their duties well. This study examines the relationship between earnings management and two 
corporate governance mechanisms (composition of board of directors and audit committee). 
1.1 Aim and Objectives of the Study 
The aim of this study is to provide information that may help improve financial reporting in Nigeria by 
investigating the relationship between earnings management and two corporate governance mechanisms. In 
order to achieve this aim, the study specifically seeks to: 
i. Examine the extent to which the proportion of independent directors affects earnings 
management in Nigeria; and 
ii. Verify the extent to which possession of certain level of financial competencies by audit 
committee members affect earnings management in Nigeria.  
 
1.2 Research Questions 
The following research questions were raised in order to achieve the objectives stated. 
i. To what extent does the proportion of independent directors affects earnings management in  
        Nigeria? 
ii.        Does the possession of certain level of financial competencies by audit committee members  
        affect earnings management in Nigeria?  
 
1.3 Research Hypotheses 
The hypotheses stated below were tested in order to provide answers to the research questions.  
Hypothesis One 
H0:  Boards with greater proportion of independent directors do not reduce the likelihood of earnings  
 management in Nigeria. 
H1: Boards with greater proportion of independent directors reduce the likelihood of earnings  
 management in Nigeria. 
Hypothesis Two 
H0: Possession of certain level of financial competencies by audit committee members do not reduce  
 the likelihood of earnings management in Nigeria. 
H1: Possession of certain level of financial competencies by audit committee members reduce the 
 likelihood of earnings management in Nigeria. 
 
1.4 Scope of the Study 
This study basically seeks to investigate the relationship between earnings management and corporate 
governance mechanisms among listed firms in Nigeria. To achieve this objective, judgmental sampling 
technique was adopted to choose respondents whose jobs are finance and accounting-related from 
companies listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange shoes headquarters are in Lagos State, Nigeria. The study 
was restricted to Lagos State as it harbours 60% of the Federation’s total industrial investments and foreign 
trade and attracts 65% of Nigeria’s commercial activities (The Academy of Business Strategy 2011).  
 
2.  Literature Review 
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One issue that has come to the forefront of recent debate on corporate failures regarding unethical behavior 
is that of earnings management. Research on earnings management shows that it is a pervasive 
phenomenon (Burgstahler & Dichev 1997) which has generated a great deal of talk and argument. 
However, earnings management is not always alleged as wrong. Arguments supporting it have also been 
made (Rudra & Bhattacharjee 2012). Scott (2003) believed that there is a good side of earnings 
management and that it can be a device to convey inside information to the market, enabling share price to 
better reflect the firm’s future prospects. The accounting profession has also accepted that not all earnings 
management techniques are deceptive. However, the current accepted idea among accountants, regulators 
and standard setters is that, more often than not, earnings management is detrimental. It deceives investors 
and reduces the dependability of financial reporting. Mulford & Comiskey (2002) defined earnings 
management as the active manipulation of earnings toward a predetermined target. In the same vein, the 
Assurance Handbook (2003) defined earnings management to include the recording of accounting entries, 
without any event to justify the accounting or the failure to record or correctly record transactions for the 
purpose of altering results. From the definitions above, it can be said that the common subject is one of 
altering results. 
It has been argued that the practice of earnings management is quite extensive among publicly traded firms 
(Barth et al. 2008; Burgstahler & Dichev 1997; Jian & Wrong 2004). Earnings management is primarily 
achieved by management actions that make it easier to achieve desired earnings levels through accounting 
choices from among Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and operating decisions. Thus, 
standard setters and the accounting profession are critically concerned about the practice of earnings 
management and the unfavorable consequence it has on financial reporting.  
 
2.1 Corporate Governance in Nigeria 
In recent times, a series of well-publicized cases of accounting improprieties in Nigeria (for example, such 
as is reported in relation to Wema Bank, NAMPAK, Finbank, and Springbank in Nigeria) has captured the 
attention of investors and regulators alike. As a result, there has been a concerted effort to devise ways of 
enhancing independence (Corporate Governance Code of Nigeria 2005; Blue Ribbon Committee 1999). 
In view of the importance attached to the institution of effective corporate governance, the Federal 
Government of Nigeria, through her various agencies came up with various institutional arrangements to 
protect the investors of their hard earned investment from unscrupulous management/directors of listed 
firms in Nigeria. These institutional arrangements, provided in the “code of corporate governance” issued 
in November 2003 The code proposes that the business of a firm should be managed under the direction of 
a board of directors who delegates to the CEO and other management staff, the day to day management of 
the affairs of the firm. The best practices of the code also recommend that the board sees to the 
appointment of a qualified person as the CEO and other management staff. The directors, with their wealth 
of experience, are expected to provide leadership and direct the affairs of the business with high sense of 
integrity, commitment to the firm, its business plans and long-term shareholder value. In addition, the board 
provides other oversight functions. Other mechanisms of corporate governance include audit committee, 
shareholders rights and privileges.  
The emergence of mega banks in the post consolidation era prompted the Central Bank of Nigeria to issue a 
new code of corporate governance which became operative in 2006. In the same vein, the Nigerian 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), published the revised Code of Corporate Governance in 
September, 2009 after consultations with other regulatory bodies. The new code was issued to address the 
weaknesses of the 2003 code and to improve the mechanism for its enforceability. It requires the separation 
of the position of the managing director from that of the chief executive officer. Also, the code 
recommends that the number of non-executive directors should be more than that of executive directors 
subject to a maximum board size of twenty (20) directors. In order to ensure both continuity and injection 
of fresh ideas, non-executive directors should not remain on the board for more than three terms of four (4) 
years each, that is, twelve (12) years. In 2009, the insurance industry also embraced a corporate governance 
code.  
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The importance of effective corporate governance to corporate and economic performance cannot be over-
emphasized in today’s global market place. Companies perceived as adopting international best corporate 
governance practices are more likely to attract international investors than those whose practices are 
perceived to be below international standards. 
Corporate Governance has succeeded in attracting a good deal of public interest because of its apparent 
importance for the economic health of corporations and society in general. However, the concept of 
corporate governance is poorly defined because it potentially covers a large number of distinct economic 
phenomena. Babatunde (2003) defines Corporate Governance as the stewardship of an organization in 
terms of the way it is run, (directed and controlled). It is concerned with the respective roles, powers, 
responsibilities and accountability of stakeholders and the board. 
 The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1999 gave a definition which is 
consistent with the submissions of Cadbury 1992; Wolfensohn 1999; Uche 2004 and Akinsulire 2006. It 
defines corporate governance as the system by which business corporations are directed and controlled. The 
corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different 
participants in the corporation, such as the board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, and spell 
out the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs. By doing this, it also provides the 
structure through which the company objectives are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and 
monitoring performance.  
 
2.2 Composition of the board and earnings management 
Among the set of corporate governance mechanisms, the board of directors is often considered the primary 
internal control mechanism to monitor top management and protect the shareholders’ interest. For example, 
Fama (1980) argues that board of directors is a “market-induced institution, the ultimate internal monitor of 
the set of contracts called a firm, whose most important role is to scrutinize the highest decision makers 
within the firm”.  
It has been argued that it is the responsibility of the directors to ensure that financial statements are 
prepared according to approved accounting standards (Saleh et al. 2005). Since the applicability of 
accounting standards is very flexible, management may choose an acceptable accounting method or 
estimate that is appropriate for the need of the organization. In this respect, the compliance with the 
accounting standards may not necessarily mean that financial statements are free from manipulation. Thus, 
the compliance with accounting standards as required in the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA), 
1990 may reduce the propensity to manage earnings but may not eliminate the entire practice of earnings 
management. Therefore, it is important that the board of directors carry out its monitoring role effectively 
in order to ensure that financial reporting provides quality information to users by reflecting proper 
underlying economic substance of the company transactions. 
The components within the board are essential ingredients for effective monitoring. The appointment of 
managers as directors (i.e. insiders) is important because they have more information about the 
organization compared to outside directors. However, domination by insiders may lead to transfer of wealth 
to managers at the expense of the stockholders (Beasley 1996; Fama 1980). Therefore, outside directors are 
appointed on the board mainly to obtain independent monitoring mechanism over the board process thereby 
reducing agency conflicts and improve performance (Craven & Wallace 2001). Consistent with this theory, 
results in prior studies suggest that outside directors are positively related to abnormal stock return 
(Rosentein & Wyatt 1990) and performance (Dalton et al. 1999) and negatively related to fraudulent 
reporting (Beasley 1996). Similarly, there is a negative relation between outside directors and earnings 
management (Klein 2002). 
However, there are critics on the role of non-executive directors on the board. Some believe that they 
perform little role in monitoring the board because lack of real independence, time, as well as enough 
information (Gilson & Kraakman 1991; Patton & Baker 1987). To be effective, independent non-executive 
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directors should have both, strong incentives to monitor the board, and the capabilities to identify earnings 
management (Peasnell et al. 2000). 
Boards dominated by outsiders are arguably in a better position to monitor and control managers (Dunn 
1987). Outside directors are independent of the firm’s managers, and in addition bring a greater breadth of 
experience to the firm (Firstenberg & Malkiel 1980; Vance 1983). A number of studies have linked the 
proportion of outside directors to financial performance and shareholders’ wealth (Brickley et al. 1994; Byrd 
& Hickman 1992; Subrahmanyan et al. 1997; Rosenstein & Wyatt 1990). Sakar et al. (2006) posit that firms 
with high quality governance mechanisms, such as independent board of directors are associated with low 
levels of earnings management. To the extent that independent outside directors monitor management more 
effectively than inside directors, this study hypothesizes that companies with a greater proportion of 
independent directors will be less likely to engage in earnings management than those whose boards are 
staffed primarily with inside directors. 
 
2.3 Audit committee and earnings management 
An audit committee is an operating committee of the Board of Directors charged with oversight of financial 
reporting and disclosure. Committee members are drawn from members of the company’s board of 
directors, with a Chairperson selected from among the committee members. The Companies and Allied 
Matters Act (CAMA), 1990 states that a public limited liability company should have an audit committee 
(maximum of six members of equal representation of three members each representing the management/ 
directors and shareholders) in place. The members are expected to be conversant with basic financial 
statements. 
The audit committee’s function has evolved over the years. The primary objective of an Audit Committee 
is to increase the credibility of annual financial statements, assist directors in meeting their responsibilities 
and enhance audit independence (Bradbury 1990). Audit Committees have been involved in monitoring 
and protecting the interests of shareholders (Harrison 1987; English 1994; Menon & Williams 1994; 
DeZoort et al. 2002; Gendron & Bedard 2006). Researchers have also argued that financial reporting is 
more reliable and questionable corporate practices are reduced where an audit committee exists (Kolins et 
al. 1991; Eichenseher & Shields 1985; DeZoort 1998; Carcello & Neal 2003). 
Due to their responsibility for oversight of internal control and financial reporting, good governance dictates 
that audit committee members should possess a certain level of financial competencies. Thus, the Blue 
Ribbon Committee (1999) recommends that each member of the audit committee should be or become 
financially literate and that at least one member should have accounting or related financial management 
expertise, where ‘experience’ is defined as ‘past employment experience in finance or accounting, requisite 
professional certification in accounting, or any other comparable experience or background which results in 
the individual’s financial sophistication, including being or having been a CEO or other senior officer with 
financial oversight  responsibilities’. This recommendation is supported by DeZoort & Salterio (2001). They 
observe that the accounting experience of audit committee members as well as their knowledge of auditing 
is positively associated with the likelihood that they will support the auditor in an auditor-corporate 
management dispute. These recommended best practices and research findings suggest that the financial 
competencies of audit committee members decrease the likelihood of earnings management. 
The audit committee has a very important role to play regarding fraud and overseeing fraud risk 
management. In this regard, audit committees play an important role in preventing, detecting and 
investigating fraud and earnings management. As far as fraud and earnings management is concerned, the 
audit committee should have zero tolerance, and all instances of such should be taken with all seriousness. 
 
3.  Research Methodology 
Survey research method was adopted in this study. The use of survey research method is justified because it 
follows a co relational research strategy and helps in predicting behavior (Bordens & Abbott 2002). 
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The population of this study is defined as all business organizations quoted on the NSE. Judgmental 
sampling technique was adopted to choose respondents whose jobs are finance and accounting-related. The 
justification for using judgmental sampling technique is that when one wishes to select a biased group for 
screening purposes, this sampling method is a good choice (Cooper & Schindler 2001). The study surveyed 
a sample of one hundred respondents in Lagos. The study was restricted to Lagos State as it harbours 60% 
of the Federation’s total industrial investments and foreign trade and attracts 65% of Nigeria’s commercial 
activities (The Academy of Business Strategy 2011).  
Primary data was obtained from the targeted respondents through a carefully constructed questionnaire. 
The questionnaire was designed to capture the demographic data of the respondents and their opinions with 
respect to the research questions. The questionnaire was divided into two (2) sections. 
Section A was designed to obtain information on the demographic details of respondents, while section B 
consisted of questions designed to establish the relationship between board compositions, audit committee 
and earnings management in Nigeria. The questionnaire was constructed using a five-point Likert type 
scale. The respondents were required to indicate the extent of their agreement or disagreement with each of 
the statements on a scale of one (1) to five (5). A score of one (1) represented strong disagreement with the 
statement, while a score of five (5) represented strong agreement. A total of eighty (80) usable responses, 
giving 80% response rate were used for data analysis. The hypotheses formulated were tested with the 
pearson chi-square statistics. 
 
4.  Data Analysis 
This section of the study is devoted to presenting the results of the analysis performed on the data collected 
to test the propositions made in the study. Analyses were carried out with the aid of the Statistical Package 
for Social Sciences, (SPSS Version 15.0). Table 1 shows the test statistics on the likelihood of reduction in 
earnings management by boards with greater proportion of independent directors. 
The chi-squared test statistic is 21.750 with an associated p-value less than 0.001 (p < 0.001). The null 
hypothesis is rejected, since p < 0.001 and the alternative hypothesis retained. It is therefore concluded that 
boards with greater proportion of independent directors is associated with earnings management in Nigeria.    
Table 2 presents the test statistics on the likelihood of reduction in earnings management by possession of 
certain level of financial competencies by audit committee members. The test statistics return a chi-squared 
value of 29.625 with an associated p-value less than 0.001 (p < 0.001). The null hypothesis is rejected, 
since p < 0.001 and the alternative hypothesis retained. It is therefore concluded that possession of certain 
level of financial competencies by audit committee members is associated with earnings management in 
Nigeria.  
 
5.  Conclusion and Recommendations 
The study aimed at analyzing the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms (board 
composition and audit committee) and earnings management.  The study found that board dominated by 
outside directors brings a greater breadth of experience to the firm and are in a better position to monitor 
and control managers.  
As regards the audit committee, it was established that audit committee is capable of increasing the public’s 
confidence in the credibility and objectivity of published financial statements. It was found that audit 
committee whose members possess certain level of financial competencies would reduce the likelihood of 
earnings management. 
In the light of the foregoing conclusions, the study recommends that board composition should include 
greater proportion of independent outside directors with corporate experience. Audit committee members 
should be encouraged to possess a certain level of financial competencies in order to decrease the likelihood 
of earnings management. Corporate organizations should provide formal orientation programs for their new 
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and existing directors and support the development of external courses on issues of corporate governance 
and earnings management. 
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Appendices 
TABLE 1:    TEST STATISTICS 
 BOARDS WITH GREATER PROPORTION OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS REDUCE 
THE LIKELIHOOD OF EARNINGS MANAGEMENT   
Chi-Square                                                                                                                                            21.750a 
Df                                                                                                                                                     4 
Asymp. Sig.                                                                                                                                                .000 
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 16.0.  
Source: Analysis of surveyed data (2011) 
 
TABLE 2: TEST STATISTICS 
 POSSESSION OF CERTAIN LEVEL OF FINANCIAL COMPETENCIES BY AUDIT 
COMMITTEE MEMBERS REDUCE THE LIKELIHOOD OF EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
 
Chi-Square                                                                                                                                                        29.625a 
Df                                                                                                                                                                 4 
Asymp. Sig.                                                                                                                                                            .000 
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 16.0. 
Source: Analysis of surveyed data (2011) 
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